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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Subversive Activities Control Act
-Exclusion of members of Communist-action organization from
employment in defense facility without showing member's
knowledge of organization's illegal purpose and specific intent
to further such illegal purpose is unconstitutional. United States
v. RobeZ (Sup. Ct. 1967).
Appellee was charged with violating section 5 (a) (1) (D) of
the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.1 On October 20,
1961, the Subversive Activities Control Board's order requiring
the Communist Party of the United States to register as a
Communist-action organization became final.2 At the time the
Board's order became final, appellee was employed at a Seattle,
Washington shipyard as a machinist and was a member of the
Communist Party. On August 20, 1962, the shipyard was des-
ignated a "defense facility" by the Secretary of Defense by
authority delegated in section 5(b) of the Act." Appellee con-
tinued his employment at the shipyard and was subsequently
indicted for a violation of section 5 (a) (1) (D). The indictment
was based upon the allegations that the appellee-with knowl-
edge of both the Order against the Party and the designation of
the shipyard as a "defense facility"--did "unlawfully and will-
fully engage in employment" at the shipyard. The United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington dAs-
missed the complaint,4 and the Government appealed directly
to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court,
hdd, affirmed but upon different grounds. The Court de-
cided that Robel's right of association protected by the first
amendment was abridged by section 5 (a) (1) (D) and that such
1. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, § 5(a) (1) (D), 50 U.S.C.
§ 784(a) (1) (D) (1964). Section 5(a) (1) (D) reads as follows:
When a Communist organization, as defined in paragraph (5) of section
782 of this title, is registered or there is in effect a final order of the
Board requiring such organization to register, it shall be unlawfuld-()
For any member of such organization, with knowledge or notice that
such organization is so registered or that such order has become final
. . .(D) if such organization is a Communist-action organization,
to engage in any employment in any defense facility....
2. Communist Party of U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367
U.S. 1 (1961).
3. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. § 784(b)
(1964).
4. United States v. Robel, 254 F. Supp. 291 (W.D. Wash. 1965).
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an abridgment was unconstitutional. United States v. RobeZ, 88
S. Ct. 419 (1967).
Through the years Congress has passed numerous laws aimed
at controlling, diminishing and negating the effects of subver-
sive activities within the boundaries of the United States. In
the late 1940's, the United States was gripped by a fear, no less
prevalent in the Congress, of Communist world domination. This
fear, coupled with a feeling of the inadequacy of existing laws
to cope with the clandestine machinations of the Communist
conspiracy, resulted in the enactment of the Subversive Activi-
ties Control Act.5 Although a cursory examination of the Act
will reveal its restrictive effect upon other areas of Communist
activity, this discussion is limited to the Supreme Court's recent
interpretation of section 5(a) (1) (D) as unconstitutional. The
Act provides, in effect, that no member of a registered Commu-
nist-action organization may be employed in any "defense facil-
ity" of the United States.
Historically, the states as well as the federal government have
had the power to exclude from employment members of subver-
sive organizations.( These exclusions were usually based on
either the employees' refusal to swear to a loyalty oath,7 or his
refusal to answer questions concerning his membership in certain
organizations.8 The Supreme Court, however, has not acted fav-
orably toward exclusions from employment based on a refusal to
swear to a loyalty oath.9 In 1952, the Court struck down an
Oklahoma oath requirement which barred persons who had been
members of certain organizations from government employ-
ment.10 In holding that the statute 11 violated due process in
that scienter was not made an element of the association, the
Court said that "[ijndiscriminate classification of innocent with
knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power."
12
5. 50 U.S.C. § 781 et seq. (1964). For a more complete discussion of the
circumstances surrounding the passing of the Act, see 2 U.S. CoDE CONG. &
AD. NEvws 3886 (1950).
6. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; Garner v. Board
of Pub. Works. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
7. See, e.g., Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
8. See, e.g., Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960); Lerner
v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) ; Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
9. For a discussion of loyalty oaths as conditions of public employment,
see COMMENT, The Loyalty Oath as a Condition of Public Employment, 19
BAYLOR L. REv. 479 (1967).
10. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
11. 51 OKL. STAT. §§ 37.1-.8 (1951).
12. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
[Vol. 20
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This requirement of knowledge of the organization's illegal pur-
poses has been consistently applied in the later decisions dealing
with loyalty oaths.13
In cases dealing with the dismissal of public employees for
failure to testify as to their membership in subversive organiza-
tions, the Court has frequently sanctioned such dismissals upon
the employees' failure to answer questions concerning their mem-
bership in subversive organizations rather than upon the mem-
bership itself.' 4
In 1958, the "right of association" emerged from the Court's
decision in NAACP v. Alabama ew rel. Patterson. 15 In promul-
gating and defining this right, the Court said:
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of
view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably en-
hanced by group association, as this court has more than
once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between
the freedoms of speech and assembly. It is beyond debate
that freedom to engage in association for the advancement
of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "lib-
erty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech. Of course,
it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced
by association pertain to political, economic, religious or
cultural matters .... 16
While eager to extend the protection of this right of asso-
ciation to individual liberties in the absence of any controlling
governmental justification for not so extending it, 17 the Court
has been unwilling to allow subversive organizations and their
members to take refuge from the restrictions of subversive acti-
vities legislation by asserting a right of association. However,
the Court has taken exception to this position in cases in which
13. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) ; Elfbrandt
v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
14. Cases cited note 8 supra.
15. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). For an extensive discussion of the right of asso-
ciation, see Comment, The Right of Association and Subversive Organiza-
tions: In Quest of a Concept, 11 VmL. L. PRv. 771 (1966).
16. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)
(citations omitted).
17. See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S.
539 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
1968]
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both an absence of specific intent and ignorance of the organ-
ization's illegal purposes can be shown.18
In Elfbrant v. RusselZl19 the Court invalidated an Arizona
loyalty oath which subjected to discharge and prosecution for
perjury state employees who took the oath and then became or
remained members of the Communist Party. In holding the oath
unconstitutional the court said, "A law which appliLs to mem-
bership without the 'specific intent' to further the illegal aims of
the organization infringes unnecessarily on protected freedoms.
It rests on the doctrine of 'guilt by association' which has no
place here." 20 A similar view was taken in holding certain sec-
tions of New York's loyalty statutes unconstitutional.
21
United States v. Rohel,22 although a consistent continuation of
the Court's test of knowledge, intent, and the right to associate,
is noteworthy in that it involved the first prosecution under sec-
tion 5 (a) (1) (D) of the Subversive Activities Control Act. In af-
firming the District Courts dismissal of the indictment, the
Court said, "It is precisely because [§ 5 (a) (1) (D)] sweeps indis-
criminately across all types of associations with Communist-
action groups, without regard to the quality and degree of
membership, that it runs afoul of the First Amendment.""8 The
Court is quick to add, however, that nothing in their decision
should be construed as denying Congress the right to exclude
subversives from "sensitive positions" in defense facilities. The
legislative means of exclusion, however, must be narrowly draft-
ed so as not to infringe substantially upon first amendment
rights.
What the Court appears to be saying is that there are "active"
Communists and there are "passive" Communists. "Active"
Communists may be excluded from employment in defense facili-
ties, but "passive" Communists may not be so excluded. The
question then arises, "How are active Communists to be dis-
tinguished from passive Communists?" It is doubtful that Coin-
18. Compare Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) with Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
19. 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
20. Id. at 19 (citations omitted).
21. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). See Comment,
Constitutional Law-Loyalty Oaths-Key Sections of New York's Loyalty
Statutes Declared Unconstitutional, 19 S.C.L. Rrv. 422 (1967).
22. 88 S. Ct. 419 (1967).
23. Id. at 423.
[Vol. 20
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munists seeking employment in defense facilities will inform
their prospective employers that they are, in fact, "active" Com-
munists seeking the immediate overthrow of the United States'
Government. The public is thus forced to rely upon the extensive
employee screening processes24 used by the Department of De-
fense and the deterrence factors of the severe penalties for
espionage and sabotage2 5 to- keep defense facilities free of those
who would imperil the nation's security.
ROBERT G. Cuminx, Jt.
24. 32 C.F.R. §§155-57.7 (1967).
25. 18 U.S.C. §§792-98 (espionage), §§2151-56 (sabotage) (1964).
1968]
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Right of Conlfrontation-The sixth
amendment requires that the witness give his actual name and
address when requested on cross-examination. SmitA v. Illinois
(Sup. Ct. 1968).
The Supreme Court in this case considered the bounds of a
defendant's constitutional right to confront his accuser.' The
witness whose testimony was in dispute identified himself only
as "James Jordan". On cross-examination he admitted that his
legal name was not as previously stated; however, prosecution's
objections to questions aimed at discovering his real name and
place of residence were sustained by the trial court. The Su-
preme Court, held, reversed. The refusal to require answers to
these questions was reversible error because it denied the defend-
ant the right to confront the witness against him. This testi-
mony was of particular importance because no one else wit-
nessed the transfer of narcotics for marked money. "James
Jordan" was given the money by two policemen who waited out-
side while the witness went into the restaurant and emerged
with the narcotics. The witness testified that he purchased the
goods from the defendant who claimed that he directed the wit-
ness to someone else. He also claimed that the marked money in
his possession was change received from the purchase of a cup of
coffee with a $5 bill. Smitz v. Illinois, 88 S. Ct. '748 (1968).
The Supreme Court relied upon Pointer v. Texas2 in making
the sixth amendment right of confrontation applicable to the
states by incorporation into the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Prior to Pointer, In re Oliver3 had held that
this right was included in the fourteenth amendment because it
was fundamental. The OZiver Court applied the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment saying that the right to ex-
amine the witness against him was a right "basic in our system
of jurisprudence. . . ."I The Court thus required in Pointer
that the state guarantee that right as determined by federal
standards laid down in all earlier decisions. The right of con-
frontation was tied to the right to counsel in holding that testi-
mony of a witness given at a preliminary hearing was inadmis-
1. U. S. CoNsT. amend. VI. "In all criminal proceedings, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witness against him ... .
Accord, S.C. CoNsT. art. 1, § 18.
2. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
3. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
4. Id. at 273.
[Vol. 20
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss3/6
RECENT DECISIONS
sible since the defendant had not had counsel to cross-examine
the witness.
Confrontation involves two steps. The primary one is the test-
ing of evidence by cross-examination, and the second is provid-
ing the trier of fact an opportunity to observe the witness as he
presents his testimony to afford insight into his credibility.
Cross-examination is an essential element, but observation may
be omitted. Confrontation as included in the sixth amendment
means giving the accused the right to cross-examine.5
The companion case to Pointer, Douglas v. Alabana,6 pro-
vided one guideline for defining confrontation. In this case the
prosecution read an alleged confession of an accomplice who
refused any comment on grounds of self-incrimination. The
confession, read sentence-by-sentence, as the prosecution asked
the witness to admit authorship, was incriminating to the de-
fendant who had no opportunity for legitimate cross-examina-
tion since the witness never testified. SMit ,v. Illinoi 7 provided
one more step in defining the vague term "confront" as used in
the sixth amendment. At the trial defendant had an opportunity
to meet the witness face-to-face and to cross-examine him in
regard to the incident for which the accused was arrested. He
was only denied the opportunity to learn the legal name and
place of residence of the witness."
The Court quoted extensively from Alford 'v. United States"
in which it had pointed to the importance of the place of resi-
dence as a part of cross-examination. The first value is to place
the witness in his proper environment so that the jury may
better weigh his statements. "The purpose of such evidence is to
identify the witness and to some extent give proper background
for the interpretation of his testimony."10 The second value of
knowing a place of residence is facilitating out-of-court investi-
gation. "Its permissible purposes, among others, are that the
5. 5 J. WiGmoRE, EvDENC E § 1365 (3d ed. 1940).
6. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
7. 88 S. Ct. 748 (1968).
8. Id. at 751. The majority ignored the testimony that the accused had
known the witness casually for a few years and that his counsel had once
represented the witness. J. Harlan, dissenting, pointed this out and contended
that this makes the error harmless or, at least, causes the case to be inap-
propriate for constitutional adjudication. J. White, concurring in the decision,
pointed out that neither party may have known the real name or address of
the witness at the time of the trial.
9. 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
10. Alford v. United States, 41 F.2d 157, 160 (9th Cir. 1930).
1968]
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witness may be identified with his community so that indepen-
dent testimony may be sought and offered of his reputation for
veracity in his own neighborhood."" Though the accused and
counsel might have known the answers, the most expeditious
method of informing the jury was to have it come from this
witness who knew best.
The defense is not required to know where the line of ques-
tioning might lead when he begins. In its very nature, cross-
examination is exploratory. Counsel searches for something
that will discredit the witness or his testimony; therefore, coun-
sel must be permitted wide latitude. 12 The trial judge retains
discretion to limit his examination if it appears that the ques-
tions are intended to harass, annoy, or humiliate,'3 but the trial
judge in Smit7h acted beyond the bounds of his discretion because
the questions had not approached the proscribed limitations.
Though there was little or no prejudice accruing from the
error made, the Court applied the rule of automatic reversal
stated in BDroolklrt v. Janis4 in connection with the right of
confrontation. It adopted counsel's contention that, "'[I]f there
was here a denial of cross-examination without waiver, it would
be a constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount
of showing of want of prejudice would cure it.' "s This decision
will affect South Carolina law. In State v. Smith' 6 the Court
held that the burden was upon the appellant to satisfy the court
that there was prejudicial error.
The case at hand should be distinguished from those cases
which involve the right of the accused to know the name of the
informer whose disclosure led to the defendant's arrest.' 7 In
none of those cases was the informer a witness at the trial so
that his testimony would influence the jury. The privilege of
withholding identity does not belong to the informers but to the
government. It stems from the public policy of making police
work easier by encouraging citizens to inform of crime by assur-
ing them that their actions will remain anonymous.' 8
11. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691 (1931).
12. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
13. 5 B. Jonrs, EVImENC § 2316 (2d ed. 1926).
14. 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
15. Id. at 3.
16. 230 S.C. 164, 94 SE.2d 886 (1956).
17. E.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) ; Roviaro v. United States,
353 U.S. 53 (1957).
18. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
[Vol. 20
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As a result of this decision the right to confront the witness
which is guaranteed in all courts after Pointer is further de-
fined. Confrontation now includes the obligation of the witness
to give his proper name and place of residence. If he is not
required to do this, there is reversible error even if no prejudice
ensues. As a constitutionally guaranteed right, confrontation
deserves absolute protection by the courts.
WALK R D. SPitunu
9
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CRIMINAL PROCEDUR Right to Counsel at Probation Re-
vocation Proceedings-A probationer is entitled to be represent-
ed by court-appointed counsel at proceedings to revoke probation
and to impose sentence when sentencing is deferred following a
guilty plea in state court. Mempv . Rhay (Sup. Ct. 1967).
The petitioner, Mempa, was convicted in the Spokane County
Superior Court of Washington of the offense of "joyriding."
The conviction was based on his plea of guilty which was en-
tered with advice of court-appointed counsel. Mempa was then
placed on probation for two years and the imposition of sen-
tence was deferred. About four months later Mempa appeared
before a hearing to revoke his probation. He was not represent-
ed by counsel and was not asked whether he wished to have
counsel appointed for him. The court revoked Mempa's proba-
tion and sentenced him to ten years in the penitentiary.
Petitioner Walking was brought before the Thurston County
Court for a hearing on a petition to revoke his probation, and
a continuance of a week was granted to enable him to retain
counsel. When the hearing was called, Walking appeared and
informed the court that he had retained an attorney who was
supposed to be present. After waiting fifteen minutes, the court
proceeded without petitioner's counsel and without offering to
appoint counsel for him. The court revoked probation and im-
posed the maximum sentence of fifteen years. Petitioners were
denied petitions of habeas corpus by the Washington Supreme
Court.1 On certiorari the United States Supreme Court con-
solidated the cases and, eldd, the state court proceedings to re-
voke probation and to impose a deferred sentence were invalid
because petitioners' rights to court-appointed counsel were vio-
lated. Afempa v. Rluy, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
Prior to Mempa there was little conflict on the question of
whether a probationer had a right to court-appointed counsel.
The general view of the federal courts was that probation was
purely a matter of judicial discretion and that since a convicted
person had no constitutional right to probation, he had very few
rights when probation was being revoked. In accordance with
that view the hearing to revoke probation was considered to be
administrative, and no right to counsel was afforded.2  Most
1. Mempa v. Rhay, 68 Wash. 2d 882, 416 P.2d 104 (1966).
2. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 348 F.2d 885 (6th Cir. 1965) ; Gillespie
v. Hunter, 159 F.2d 410 (10th Cir. 1947) ; Bennett v. United States, 158 F.2d
412 (8th Cir. 1946); Cupp v. Byington, 179 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Ind. 1960).
[ ol. 20
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss3/6
RECENT DECISIONS
state courts adhered to these views, but the idea that an indigent
defendant has a right to court-appointed counsel in such a
procedure was accepted by a small minority of state courts.3
Rather than delving into the past on this precise point the
Supreme Court chose to examine its precedents in closely related
areas. The Court in Townsend v. Burke4 held that the Pennsyl-
vania Court-after receiving a guilty plea and prior to sentenc-
ing-violated due process by reading the defendant's record of
previous offenses because the defendant was not represented by
counsel during sentencing. This was accompanied by the fact
that the court accepted assumptions about his criminal record
which were materially untrue. In Moore v. MichigaO the Court
stated, "The right to counsel is not a right confined to repre-
sentation during the trial on the merits."8 There the defendant
had been prejudiced by the absence of counsel at a hearing fol-
lowing his guilty plea to determine the degree of the crime. Then
in Hamilton v. AZabamaT the Court decided that failure to ap-
point counsel at arraignment violated due process because of the
critical nature of the arraignment stage.
These cases carved out exceptions to the general rule estab-
lished by Betts v. Brady.8 In this decision the Court ruled that
the sixth amendment applied only to trial in federal courts and
that "due process of law" of the fourteenth amendment did not
obligate states to furnish counsel in every criminal case in
which the accused was unable to obtain counsel. However, in
Gideon v. Wainwrigh 9 the Court specifically overruled Betts
and held that the sixth amendment guarantee of counsel was a
fundamental right and thus was made obligatory upon the
states by the fourteenth amendment. The Court in Mempa con-
sidered that once the bonds of Betts were stripped away by
Gideon, the cases of Townsend, Moore, and Hamilton stand for
the proposition that appointment of counsel for an indigent is
3. See, e.g., Hoffman v. State, 404 P2d 644 (Alas. 1965); Williams v.
Commonwealth, 350 Mass. 732, 216 N.E.2d 779 (1966); Blea v. Cox, 75 N.M.
265. 403 P.2d 701 (1965); People v. Hamilton, 26 App. Div. 2d 134, 271
N.Y.S.2d 694 (1966); cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Remeriez v. Maroney, 415
Pa. 534, 204 A.2d 450 (1964).
4. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
5. 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
6. Id. at 160. The case was reversed on the grounds that the defendant did
not intelligently and understandingly waive counsel before pleading guilty.
7. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
8. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
9. 372 U.S. 355 (1963).
1968]
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required at every stage of a criminal proceeding in which sub-
stantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected.
In view of the rather broad use that the Court has made of
its precedents in deciding this case, it would appear that the
Court in Mempa is stating a very broad rule meant to impose
upon the states strict standards for the appointment of counsel
for indigents in probation revocation proceedings. However,
after stating sufficient grounds for establishing a broad rule,
the Court considers how the rights of Mempa and Walking
might have been affected under Washington law. In the case
of a guilty plea followed by probation, an appeal may be taken
only after probation is terminated and sentence imposed,10 so
absence of counsel at this time might result in a loss of the
right to appeal. Also, at any time prior to the imposition of
sentence, a guilty plea may be withdrawn and other pleas en-
tered. 11 Thus the probationer is given a chance to withdraw a
guilty plea, which might well have been entered upon induce-
ment of probation, when probation is being revoked.
Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court has failed
to establish precise standards for the states to follow. The Court
has made it difficult to ascertain whether the standard that it
established is broad in light of its view of Townsend, Moore, and
Gideon, or whether it is narrowed to a situation in which a
guilty plea may be withdrawn or an appeal taken for the first
time, as under Washington law. The first interpretation of the
Mempa doctrine came within a month. In United jStates v.
Hartse11'2 the defendant pleaded guilty to violations of federal
internal revenue laws. Imposition of sentence on two of the five
counts was suspended and Hartsell was placed on probation
following incarceration on three of the counts. His probation was
revoked in absence of counsel, and sentence was imposed on the
remaining two counts. Hartsell requested a reduction in sen-
tence"8 which the district court denied. The court, having quoted
Mempa, stated,
At first blush, the foregoing language might be accepted as
holding that a federal probationer, such as Mr. Hartsell,
who admits in a revocation hearing the violation of, or is
10. State v. Farmer, 39 Wash. 2d 675, 237 P.2d 734 (1951).
11. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.40.175 (1959).
12. 277 F. Supp. 993 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
13. See FE. . CaRm. P. 35.
[Vol. 20
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss3/6
RECENT DEcIsIoNs
found judicially to have violated, the conditions of his
probationary sentence, and as a consequence is sentenced, is
entitled to the benefit of retained or appointed counsel.
Such is not the holding, however. 14
Here the court stated that it chose to follow the precedents
established by the federal courts of appeal1r and distinguished
Mempa on the probationers' ability to withdraw their guilty
pleas prior to sentencing.
An opposite view of Mempa was taken in People ex re?. Combs
v. LaVaZlee.16 Here the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate
Division, stated,
In Mempa, ... the court enunciated the principle...
'that appointment of counsel for an indigent is required at
every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial
rights of a criminal accused may be affected.'17
Combs involved revocation of parole rather than probation, but
the court did not view the difference as significant with re-
spect to right to counsel.
The differing views of Atempa taken by these courts probably
exemplify the reception that Memwpa will receive in the state
courts. It might be suggested, however, that the Supreme Court
was attempting to establish a broad standard in regard to the
right to counsel to indigents in state court proceedings revoking
probation in which substantial rights of the probationer were
affected. The Mempa Court enunciated that standard, and in
dealing with the specific state law the Court was simply attempt-
ing to show the kind of substantial rights that would constitute
a violation of this standard.
JOHN C. B. Sxnm, JR.
14. 277 F. Supp. 993, 994-95 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
15. Cases cited note 2 supra.
16. 286 N.Y.S2d 600 (1968).
17. Id. at 603.
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INSURANCE--Construction of Policy Provision-In an inclu-
sionary clause, which is to be given a broad and liberal construc-
tion, a "relative resident of the same household" is one other
than a temporary or transient visitor who lives with others in
the same house for a period of some duration. Buddin .v. Nation-
wide Mutual Insurance Company (S.C. 1967).
Alton E. Buddin, Jr., had a wreck while operating an unin-
sured automobile belonging to a friend. Plaintiff Aetna Cas-
ualty Insurance Co. had paid $2,000 under the uninsured motor-
ist clause of the policy on the injured's automobile to the two
occupants of the car Buddin negligently hit. Aetna then in-
stituted this suit to determine whether Buddin was an addi-
tional insured under the inclusionary clause of a policy respon-
dent had written insuring Buddin's uncle, Horace E. Buddin.
The policy provided protection to "any relative resident of the
same household." At the time of the accident, Buddin was liv-
ing in his uncle's house which had been bought from the estate of
Buddin's father. In the two years preceding the accident,
Buddin had lived for varying periods at several other places.
For two months prior to the accident and for several months
after the accident, Buddin lived in the uncle's house. He paid a
small amount of rent when he was working and had free use
of the house. On occasion, he ate groceries bought by the uncle.
His uncle exerted little control over him. :Neither considered the
arrangement permanent. His uncle felt some responsibility for
Alton and sought occasionally to advise him. At trial it was
agreed that the only issue was "Were Horace E. Buddin and
Alton E. Buddin, Jr., relative residents of the same household
on the date of the accident?" The lower court allowed the jury
to decide. The jury found in the negative. Plaintiff's timely
motions for directed verdict and judgment non obstante vere-
dioto were overruled.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina, held, re-
versed. Plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict should have
been granted since the facts allowed only one reasonable infer-
ence, that Horace and Alton Buddin were relative residents of
the same household at the time of the accident. Buddin v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 157 S.E.2d 633 (S.C.
1967).
The court reaffirmed the rule that the refusal of the trial
judge to grant a directed verdict and judgment non obstante
[Vol. 20
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veredicto, the court will view the evidence most favorably to
respondent.'
Because there were no apposite fact situations in South Caro-
lina cases, the court relied upon persuasive authority from other
jurisdictions. The provision under interpretation was an inclu-
sionary clause designed to extend coverage. nclusionary clauses
are widely held to be construed broadly in favor of the insured,
such extension being the presumed intention of the parties. 2 Cor-
respondingly, exclusionary clauses are given a narrower interpre-
tation.8 "This is necessary because in both situations the courts
favor an interpretation of coverage." 4 For example, when an
exclusionary clause denies coverage to a member of a family
resident within a household, the narrower construction of who
is resident will allow recovery in a greater number of cases.5
"The touchstone is that the phrase 'resident of the same house-
hold' has no absolute or precise meaning. . . ." Household has
often been interpreted to include those dwelling together "as a
family."7 However, many courts give household a broader
meaning than family in the sense of those related by blood or
marriage.8 Household has been said to include domestic ser-
vants.9 One court has said that residents of the same household
do not always have to live in the same house. 10 In that case a
husband and wife occupied separate houses on the same lot with
the son freely visiting the father after separation proceedings;
the father maintained both houses. The purpose of the clause
often aids in determining its meaning." Thus the South Caro-
lina court interpreted a family-household clause to exclude
1. E.g., Grier v. Cornelius, 247 S.C. 521, 148 S.E.2d 338 (1966) ; Kelley v.
City of Aiken, 245 S.C. 503, 141 S.E.2d 651 (1965); Jennings v. McCowan,
215 S.C. 404, 55 S.E2d 522 (1949).
2. Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 430,
146 S.E2d 410 (1966); American Universal Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 62 Wash.
2d 595, 384 P2d 367 (1963).
3. Cartier v. Carier, 84 N.H. 153 A 6 (1931).
4. Buddin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 157 S.E2d 633, 635 (S.C. 1967).
5. Island v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., 30 Cal. 2d 541, 184 P.2d 153
(1947).
6. Buddin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 157 S.E.2d 633,637 (S.C. 1967).
7. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. James, 80 F.2d 802 (4th Cir.
1936).
8. E.g., Hoff v. Hoff, 132 Pa. Super. 431, 1 A2d 506 (1938).
9. E.g., Engebretson v. Austvold, 199 Minn. 399, 271 N.W. 809 (1937).
10. Mazilli v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 35 N.J. 1, 170 A.2d 800 (1961).
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members of the domestic circle from coverage since the purpose
of the clause was to avoid sympathetic suits.'2 However, in the
absence of ambiguity, insurers are entitled to a construction of
the policy according to the plain meaning of the words.'"
The Court found three specific issues not determinative of
whether Alton Buddin was a resident of his uncle's household.
The first of these was the payment of board while a resident of
his uncle's household;14 Second, the absence of control by the
uncle over the nephew ;1" and third, the lack of permanence in
the living arrangements.' 8 The facts were that Alton Buddin
had no other place of residence and could not be classified as
an independent boarder or as a guest of his uncle. The court
quoted with approval the definition in Hardware Mutual In-
suranee Go. v. Home Idemnity Co.: "We think that a resi-
dent of the same household is one, other than a temporary or
transient visitor, who lives together with others in the same
house for a period of some duration, although he may not intend
to remain there permanently."'' 7
It should be noted that the same provision under construction
here appears in the standard form insurance policy of the South
Carolina Code in these words: "The term 'insured' means the
named insured and, while resident of the same household, the
spouse of any such named insured and relatives of either. ..- Is
In Pacific Insurane Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurane Co.,19
the South Carolina Supreme Court held this section applicable
to all liability policies issued within the state. The court felt




13. E.g., Tomlyanovich v. Tomlyanovich, 239 Minn. 250, 58 N.W.2d 855
(1953).
14. See Teems v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 53, 147 S.E2d
20 (1966); Morris v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 88 Ga. App. 844, 78
S.E.2d 354 (1953) ; Tomlyanovich v. Tomlyanovich, 239 Minn. 250, 58 N.W2d
855 (1953).
15. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 241 Cal. App. 2d 303,
50 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1966).
16. Newcomb v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 260 N.C. 402, 133 S.E2d 20 (1963);
Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 241 Cal. App. 2d 303, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 508 (1966).
17. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 241 Cal. App. 2d 303,
50 Cal. Rptr. 508, 514 (1966), as quoted in Buddin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 157 S.E.2d 633, 636 (S.C. 1967).
18. S.C. CODE A N. § 46-750.31 (Supp. 1967). (emphasis added).
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This case is significant for two reasons. First, the court has
held that neither payment of rent by a boarder, lack of control
over activities, nor lack of permanency of the residency militated
against a finding of residency in a household. Moreover, since
the term "relative resident of the same household" is not am-
biguous, it appears the facts of a case will have to be capable
of the inference that a disputed additional insured is a resident
of more than one household before a jury will be allowed to de-
termine actual residence. Secondly, the court adopted a broad
definition of household, indicating that "household" is not
equated with "family". Buddim is in keeping with, and may be
viewed as an extension of, the general rule of construction in
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MONOPOLIES-Bank Mergers-If a proposed bank merger does
not comply with the usual antitrust analysis, then, as provided
by the 1966 Bank Merger Act, the merger may be sustained if
it meets the additional requirement that the benefits to the
community outweigh the anticompetitive disadvantages. United
States v. Third NationaZ Bank. (Sup. Ct. 1968).
Congressional dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the 1960 Bank Merger Acf
1 in several decisions2
led to the enactment of the Bank Merger Act of 19663 in order
to effectuate substantial changes in the law applicable to this
field. The second case decided by the Court under the 1966 Act,
United States v. Third National Bank,4 commenced with the
United States filing suit to enjoin consummation of a merger
between the Third National Bank and the Nashville Bank and
Trust Company. Third National was the second largest bank
in Davidson County, Tennessee, and owned 33.6% of the total
bank assets in that county while Nashville Bank, the county's
fourth largest bank, possessed 4.8% of the total bank assets. In
agreeing with the findings of the Comptroller of the Currency,
the district court denied the injunction, holding that the merger
would not tend substantially to lessen competition and that any
anticompetitive effect would be outweighed by the "conven-
ience and needs of the community to be served." On direct ap-
peal the Supreme Court, held, judgment reversed and remand-
ed. The United States established that this merger would tend
to lessen competition, and also that the district court applied an
erroneous standard which did not demonstrate community bene-
fits in terms of "convenience and needs" sufficient to outweigh
the anticompetitive impact. United States v. Third National
Bank, 88 S. Ct. 882 (1968).
While federal supervision of banking has been called "the
outstanding example in the federal government of regulation of
an entire industry through methods of supervision," 5 it was
not until 1963 that the Supreme Court first considered the ap-
plication of the antitrust laws to commercial banking.6 The first
1. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1966).
2. United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964);
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
3. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (Supp. II, 1966).
4. 88 S. Ct. 882 (1968). United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, the first
case decided under the 1966 Act, is discussed infra n. 7.
5. 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISRATIVE LAW § 4.04, at 247 (1958).
6. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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decision under the 1960 Bank Merger Act dealt only with the
competitive aspects of the merger and failed to consider its
benefits to the community. To negate the decision, Congress
passed an amendment to the Bank Merger Act in 1966.
United States v. First City NationaZ Bank, 7 the first case
decided by the Supreme Court under the 1966 Act, recognized
that the burden of proof fell upon the banks to establish that
an anticompetitive merger came within the "convenience and
needs of the community" exception, since it is a general rule
that one who claims to come within an exception to a statute
must bear the burden of proof. In addition the Supreme Court
held that the language of the Act requiring courts to "review
de novo the issue presented" meant that an independent deter-
mination of all issues should be made. Since Houston Bank dis-
posed of only procedural issues, the Court in Third Nationa&
Bank had to decide the previously reserved substantive issues
of the bank mergers.
As demonstrated by Congressional debate, the "competitive
factor" under the Act "is drawn directly from the Clayton Act
section 7 and Sherman Act section 1 . . . [which means that]
all of the principles developed .. . in regard to these statutes,
such as the definition of relevant market and the failing com-
pany doctrine are . . .unchanged .... 2- At this point it is
necessary to consider briefly the positions of the two banks in
the Nashville community.
Both the district court and the Supreme Court recognized that
the two merging banks played significantly different roles in the
Nashville community. Until 1956 Nashville Bank and Trust had
been largely a trust institution, but in that year changed its
focus in an attempt to become a full service commercial bank.
While this venture was successful at first, the district court
demonstrated that Nashville Bank and Trust was severely han-
dicapped by the advanced age of its management and its lack
of physical facilities for expansion.
On the other hand, the Comptroller of the Currency charac-
terized Third National as one of the strongest and best man-
aged banks in the nation. Third National had fourteen branch
7. 386 U.S. 361 (1967).
8. 112 CoNG. REc. 2451 (1966) (remarks of Congressman Minish).
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banks to Nashville Bank's one. Third National served as corres-
pondent bank for smaller institutions in the central south, but
Nashville Bank had no such program. Nashville Bank, however,
did have considerable size: Its total assets were $50,900,000, and
deposits totaled $45,500,000 representing 4.8% of the entire Nash-
ville banking business.
Applying the standards of section 7 of the Clayton Act,9 the
Supreme Court concluded that this merger would lessen com-
petition for several reasons. First, as a result of the merger the
market share of the three largest banks rose from 937 to 98%,
and the merged banks alone had 40% of the Nashville banking
market. Second, Nashville Bank and Trust was an important
competitive element in many facets of Nashville banking since
it offered somewhat different services from those of other banks.
Moreover, Nashville Bank and Trust could in no way be con-
sidered a "failing company" since its absolute size had increased
steadily since 1956 and in the year 1963 alone it had after-tax
earnings of $368,000.
Since the lower court erroneously concluded that the merger
would not tend to lessen competition, any required balancing
test obviously would be suspect. "To weigh adequately one of
these factors against the other requires a proper conclusion as
to each." 0 Thus, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case so that the district court could again perform the balancing
test.
The Court, however, found a second reason for remanding.
It held that the district court "misapprehended" the meaning
of the phrase "convenience and needs of the community". Under
the Bank Merger Act the intent of Congress was that public in-
terest be the ultimate test imposed for determining the validity
of a merger. Congressional intent demonstrated further that a
merger should be judged in terms of its overall effect upon the
public interest so that if a merger "posed a choice between pre-
serving competition and satisfying the requirements of con-
venience and need, the injury and benefit were to be weighed
9. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). The United States appealed only from the dis-
missal of the Clayton Act charge. Section 1 of the Sherman Act was not con-
sidered by the Court.
10. 88 S. Ct. 882, 890 (1968).
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and decisions was to rest on which alternative better served the
public interest."1
United States v. Philadephia NationaZ Bank: 2 decided under
the 1960 Act, rejected the contention that the combined bank
would be better able to serve Philadelphia by making larger
loans which previously had to be obtained from New York banks.
One purpose of the amended Act was to give such factors, not
previously relevant, suitable weight. The Supreme Court found
in the present case, however, that because the district court was
not specific in describing the "beneficial consequences" of the
combined bank's assets to the Nashville community, "the in-
creased lending capacity of the new bank" was of little value
to it on appeal.' 3
The securing of better banking service for the community and
the solving of managerial problems are both proper elements for
consideration in weighing convenience and need against lessen-
ing of competition. Indeed, the Act requires consideration of
managerial as well as financial resources in weighing a proposed
merger. The Court stated, moreover, that "it was incumbent up-
on those seeking to merge . . .to demonstrate that they made
reasonable efforts to solve the management dilemma . . . short
of merger with a major competitor .... "I' The lower court
failed to require this since it did not ascertain what efforts were
taken toward recruitment of new management. The conclusion,
then, is that a merger should not be approved under the Act
unless the benefits conferred upon the community by the merger
could not reasonably be achieved in other ways.
In a concurring opinion Justice Harlan disagreed with the
"numbers game" test for determining Clayton Act violations,
but considered himself bound by precedent. His principal dis-
agreement with the majority opinion was his belief that the
lower court record revealed adequate findings that the benefits
to the community could not have been reasonably achieved by
11. Id. at 891. Cf. 112 CoNG. REc. 2449 (1966) (remarks of Congressman
Multer) in which it is stated that:
[I]t was the intention of Congress originally in 1960 when we enacted
the Bank Merger Act that the public interest should be paramount in
making any determination with reference to a merger. The words 'in
the public interest' are again written into this bill now and will remain
in the law so that there will be no question but that the courts and the
agencies must take the public interest into account.
12. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
13. 88 S. Ct. 882, 892 (1968).
14. Id at 893.
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any other means. While he agreed with the majority that a
Clayton Act violation had been made out, under his rationale
the only question for the district court to decide would be
whether the antitrust violation should yield to other factors
bearing on public "convenience and needs."
Under the Bank Merger Act of 1966, even if the courts find
that a proposed merger would lessen competition, they may
nevertheless uphold the merger if the "needs and convenience"
outweigh the anticompetitive disadvantages. In determining the
benefit to the public, such factors as overall public interest, bet-
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